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Abstract 
In the past few years, the world has witnessed an unprecedented popular backlash against 
international institutions. Popular demands to not only slow down, but to reverse international 
integration have proliferated, and have resulted in referendum and election outcomes that have 
reverberated across the world. Examples range from the Swiss 2014 mass immigration initiative 
over the British 2016 Brexit referendum to the 2016 election of a US President seemingly 
determined to withdraw US support from various international treaties. The implications of 
these mass-based disintegration efforts reach far beyond the countries in which they originate. 
First, the disintegration process is shaped by how remaining member states respond to one 
member’s bid to unilaterally change or terminate the terms of an existing international 
agreement. Second, mass-based disintegration bids also pose considerable risks of political 
contagion by encouraging disintegrative tendencies in other countries. Yet despite their 
disruptive nature, very little research exists beyond individual case studies on the general 
drivers, dynamics and challenges these instances of mass-based disintegration pose for 
international cooperation. This paper therefore engages in a comparative inquiry into the mass 
politics of disintegration that pays particular attention to the strategic dilemmas these instances 
pose for the affected international institutions and their remaining member states. It argues that 
the remaining member states have incentives to intervene in domestic campaigns in which 
disintegration figures as a viable outcome, but that the difficulties of successful intervention are 
considerable. It also shows that after a vote in favor of disintegration, the remaining member 
states face an “accommodation dilemma” between preserving as many cooperation gains as 
possible and making exit costly in order to discourage other member states from following suit. 
Paper prepared for presentation at the IPES 2018 Annual Meeting at MIT, Cambridge MA 
October 2018 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the world has witnessed an unprecedented popular backlash against 
international institutions. Faced with increasing trade-offs between the gains from international 
cooperation, democracy, and national sovereignty (Rodrik 2011), popular demands to not only 
slow down, but to reverse international integration have proliferated. The most prominent 
example of such an instance of “mass-based disintegration” is the 2016 Brexit referendum in 
the United Kingdom (UK), in which British voters decided to leave the European Union (EU). 
This direct democratic vote has set in motion the biggest withdrawal negotiations ever seen in 
an international organization. Although highly disruptive and unusual, Brexit is, however, not 
unique. Voters in Greece, Iceland, and Switzerland have used popular referendums to repudiate 
the terms of existing international agreements in recent years. And US President Trump has 
fulfilled key campaign promises by withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord and 
renegotiating the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) agreement. Skepticism about the 
merits of international cooperation is nothing new (see for examples the overviews in Hobolt 
and de Vries 2016; Kuo and Naoi 2015). But the vehemence with which it has manifested itself 
more recently is a new development.  
Much research has focused on the causes of this popular turn against international 
cooperation (there is a growing literature on this issue, see e.g., Clarke et al. 2017; Curtis et al. 
2014; Goodwin and Heath 2016; Hobolt 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Sciarini et al. 2015). 
Much attention has also been paid to the internal political struggles that follow upon popular 
votes to fully or partially withdraw from an international agreement. However, there is much 
less research about what a unilateral withdrawal from an international institution means for the 
institution’s other member states. This is surprising because the consequences of mass-based 
efforts of disintegration reach far beyond the countries in which they originate. Not only does 
one member’s unilateral bid to improving its membership terms threaten to leave the others 
worse off. Mass-based disintegration bids by one member state also reverberate among the mass 
public in other countries. This is particularly true when the withdrawal occurs in a highly visible 
and politicized manner such as through a referendum vote, because such processes tend to be 
highly politicized, perceived as legitimate, and receive a lot of attention both at home and 
abroad.  
For example, after the Brexit referendum vote, euphoric Eurosceptics across Europe, 
from France’s Marine le Pen to the Slovak People's Party-Our Slovakia, called for similar 
referendums in their own countries. And across the Atlantic, then-candidate Donald Trump 
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tweeted that British voters “took their country back, just like we will take America back.”1 
Similarly, the leaders of Spain’s Podemos or Italy’s Five-Star-Movement celebrated Greece’s 
2015 referendum-based bid for a more generous bailout package, raising fears that it would 
spark similar demands in other Eurozone crisis countries.  
Mass-based disintegration thus poses considerable risks of political contagion by 
weakening the benefits of international cooperation and emboldening integration-sceptics 
elsewhere. Not surprisingly, this phenomenon is widely seen as a serious threat to international 
cooperation. The Economist has warned that the “politics of anger” might lead to an unravelling 
of globalization and the prosperity it has created (The Economist 2016). This concern is shared 
by academics, who have argued that growing popular support for disintegration poses a 
fundamental challenge for international institutions such as the EU (e.g., Hobolt 2016; Blyth 
2016) and the contemporary liberal world order more generally (e.g., Ikenberry 2018; Pepinsky 
2017; Rodrik 2017). However, political contagion does not always occur. For example, public 
support for the EU has increased since the Brexit referendum (Eurobarometer 2017) and 
popular appetite to leave the Paris Accord has not spread to other countries, and no other 
country has followed the US in withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord. 
Against this backdrop, it is imperative to better understand how mass-based attempts to 
revert integration spread, how they can be contained, and which dynamics they produce in the 
international arena. In short, we need a better understanding of the mass politics of international 
disintegration and their implication for international relations.  
However, our theoretical tools to develop such an understanding so are underdeveloped. 
There is vast research on the creation and functioning of international institutions (for 
overviews, see e.g. Martin and Simmons 2013; Pevehouse and von Borzyskowski 2016; 
Gilligan and Johns 2012), but analysis of how such institutions disintegrate has remained 
rudimentary (for notable exceptions, see Helfer 2005; von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2018a; 
Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996; Helfer 2017; Leeds and Savun 2007).2 For example, in the 
Oxford Handbook of International Organizations (Cogan, Hurd, and Johnstone 2016), none of 
the 55 chapters focuses on the dissolution of international organizations. Even in research on 
the European Union, where scholars have had to grapple with the challenges of popular 
Euroscepticism for some time (Hooghe and Marks 2009), a theory of European disintegration 
                                                        
1 Tweet from June 24, 2016 
2 I define international institutions as relatively stable sets of norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors 
in the system and their activities (Duffield 2007). They cover a spectrum that ranges from international treaties to supranational 
organizations. 
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remains elusive (Börzel 2018). Scholars agree that disintegration is not “integration in reverse”, 
but not on much else (Vollaard 2014; Jones 2018; Webber 2013; Rosamond 2016). A better 
understanding of the causes, dynamics, and consequences of international disintegration is thus 
urgently needed (Schneider 2017). 
This paper works towards this goal by conceptualizing and systematically exploring the 
mass politics of international disintegration. It first defines mass-based disintegration as 
unilateral attempt by one member state to change or terminate the terms of an existing 
international agreement on the basis of a strong popular mandate. Mass-based disintegration is 
thus a specific type of international disintegration. It then examines the challenges that a mass-
based disintegration bid by member state presents to the remaining member states: I argue that 
the mass politics of international disintegration are fundamentally shaped by an 
“accommodation dilemma,” that is the dilemma that accommodating the revisionist country’s 
disintegration bid carries large contagion risks, but that non-accommodation is costly to the 
remaining member states. The remainder of the paper examines how this dilemma shapes how 
the remaining member states respond to mass-based disintegration, both before the vote (section 
4) and after the vote (section 5). The final section discusses the long-term challenges that the 
mass politics of disintegration pose for international cooperation. Throughout the paper, I draw 
on evidence from several recent mass-based disintegration processes in Europe.  
 
2. What is Mass-based Disintegration? 
I define mass-based disintegration as a process in which a member state of an 
international institution attempts to unilaterally change or terminate the terms of an existing 
international agreement on the basis of a strong popular mandate. It aims at international 
disintegration because it seeks to partly or fully withdraw from the rules of an international 
institution, such as an international agreement or an international or supranational organization. 
It is mass-based because it is grounded in strong domestic popular support, expressed for 
example a referendum vote or as part of a successful candidate’s election campaign. This not 
only provides the disintegration decision with a high degree of democratic legitimacy, but also 
politicizes the question of whether an international treaty can be changed ex post or terminated 
among the other member states (Zürn 2014; Hutter, Grande, and Kriesi 2016). Mass-based 
instances of disintegration therefore tend to be much more politicized and salient in the political 
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debate than disintegration decisions taken by a small foreign policy elite.3 Mass-based 
disintegration should be seen as a process. Its starting point is domestic integration scepticism, 
but it acquires an international dimension as soon as the national government takes up this 
mounting domestic pressure to negotiate better membership terms with the other member states. 
If the other states do not accommodate such a request, the process can accelerate: the 
disintegrating state officially announces its intention to partially or fully withdraw from the 
international institution, negotiates the terms of withdrawal, and ultimately withdraws from 
specific rules or the entire international institution. Of course, the process can also end along 
this way, if the disintegrating state backs down. The most prominent example of such an 
instance of “mass-based disintegration” is the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom 
(UK), in which British voters decided to leave the European Union (EU). This direct democratic 
vote has set in motion the biggest withdrawal negotiations ever seen in an international 
organization. Although highly disruptive and unusual, Brexit is, however, not unique. Voters 
in Greece, Iceland, and Switzerland have used popular referendums to repudiate the terms of 
existing international agreements in recent years. And across the Atlantic, US President Trump 
has fulfilled key campaign promises by withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord or the Iran 
deal, and renegotiating the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) agreement.  
Scepticism about the merits of international cooperation is nothing new (see for 
examples the overviews in Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Kuo and Naoi 2015). But the vehemence 
with which it has manifested itself more recently is a new development. Figure 1 shows that 
mass-based disintegration efforts have proliferated in the recent decade. It focuses on 
referendums, the clearest form of mass-based disintegration efforts and distinguishes between 
“integration referendums” that establish or deepen cooperation between states and 
“disintegration referendums” that, if successful, roll back existing forms of international 
cooperation, either partially by unilaterally mandating changes to an agreement, or fully, by 
mandating a withdrawal.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 For a discussion of these latter instances, see von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2018a) or Leeds and Savun 
(2007). 
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Figure 1: Number of integration and disintegration referendums, 1970-2016 
 
Source: C2D Datenbank, Zentrum für Demokratie Aarau, updated by myself for recent years. 
Notes: Own classification of all national referendums on questions concerning international cooperation. 
 
Figure 1 shows that while referendums aimed at international disintegration are still 
relatively rare, they have become much more frequent and much more dominant in recent years. 
Six of the ten disintegration referendums held so far and almost all ‘successful’ ones (i.e. 
resulting in a disintegrative vote) have been held since 2014.4 Moreover, populist leaders across 
Europe have called for more disintegration referendums, so that the number may continue to 
grow. It is not a coincidence that these referendums are mostly directed against the EU, which 
has achieved a level of integration that makes the trade-offs between national sovereignty, 
democracy and international cooperation gains particularly pronounced (Rodrik 2011). 
 
3. Mass-based disintegration as a challenge for the other member states 
Mass-based disintegration efforts by one member state create considerable challenges 
for the other parties to the respective international agreement or international institution, both 
before and after the vote to renegotiate or withdraw from an international institution. First, such 
unilateral decisions undermine the overall economic and political attractiveness of the 
international institution. International cooperation is typically established because both sides 
benefit from such cooperation, even if the gains of cooperation are not always shared equally 
(Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane 1984; Gruber 2000). This suggests that the withdrawal of 
                                                        
4 These are the 1975 UK referendum on continued EC membership, the 1984 Greenland referendum on leaving 
the EC, the 1986 Spanish referendum on continued NATO membership, the 2000 Brazil IMF referendum, the 
2010 and 2011 Icesave referendums, the 2014 Swiss “Against Mass Immigration” initiative, the 2014 Swiss 
ECOPOP initiative, the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, the 2016 Swiss Implementation Initiative, the 2016 
Hungarian refugee quota referendum, and the 2016 British Brexit referendum.  
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one member state or a renegotiation in one state’s favor reduces the share of the cooperation 
gains the other member states enjoy. By reintroducing barriers to cooperation that the 
international institution had hitherto removed, it is costly both in economic and more general 
efficiency terms. For example, if disintegration leads to the re-introduction of trade barriers, 
exporters in both the remaining members and the leaving state will be hurt and international 
supply chains will be disrupted. This is likely to cause job losses and economic downturns in 
both the leaving state and the remaining members. Other forms of cooperation and policy 
coordination between the remaining countries and the leaving country – from police 
cooperation to environmental protection – are also likely to become more difficult. This creates 
transaction costs, economic distortions, and also financial risks that arise as economic agents 
adjust to the new disintegrated environment. This in turn reduces the attractiveness of the 
international institution for the remaining member states, which creates the risks that other 
member states will find it no longer worth to pay the price of membership. Moreover, especially 
when the withdrawing member state is an important and powerful member, upholding the 
institution may be difficult, even when the remaining member states in principle want to do it 
– the Iran Nuclear Deal is a case in point. At the same time, short-term fixes such as exceptions 
for the disintegrating state, may stabilize the IO in the short term, but are likely to create 
incentives for policymakers and voters elsewhere to pursue similar strategies. This then risks 
undermining the long term stability of IO (de Vries, Hobolt, and Walter 2018). 
This is related to a second risk, the risk of political contagion. Disintegration moves by 
one member state are likely to embolden integration-sceptics elsewhere, especially when the 
outcome as seen as an improvement of that member state’s situation. By demonstrating that 
countries can unilaterally improve their position through mass-based disintegration bids 
(Hobolt 2016; de Vries 2017), unilateral renegotiations of or withdrawals from international 
agreements are likely to spur similar demands in other member states as well. Empirical 
research shows that when powerful states withdraw from international organizations, smaller 
countries tend to follow suit (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2018b).5 This effect is likely to 
be particularly pervasive when the disintegration move is strongly rooted in domestic mass 
politics. This is because such instances tend to be highly salient and politicized and therefore 
tend to radiate far beyond their own country. As a result, such instances are particularly likely 
                                                        
5 This political contagion effect has also been well documented in the context of secessionist movements on the 
national level (Walter 2006b; 2006a; Coggins 2011). 
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to affect public opinion and disintegration support in other member states (Hobolt 2016; de 
Vries 2017; Walter 2017a).  
The remaining member states thus face considerable challenges when faced with a 
unilateral, mass-based disintegration bid by one member state. How this process evolves, and 
whether and to what extent the country succeeds or aborts its disintegration request, however, 
depends to a large degree on the other member states of the international institution. For 
example, bids for renegotiation of the terms of an international agreement in one country’s 
favor can be successful, as the recent NAFTA renegotiation shows. In these negotiations, 
launched in order to keep a key campaign promise of US president Trump, the US secured 
concessions from Mexico and Canada in the renegotiated USMCA agreement that left the 
former worse off and the US better off than under NAFTA. However, the success of countries 
aiming to renegotiate the terms of existing agreements vary considerably. Whereas the UK only 
received limited concessions during its pre-Brexit negotiations with the EU, for example, Swiss 
and Greek attempts to renegotiate their relationship with the EU/Eurozone were significantly 
less successful. In fact, because the remaining member states made withdrawal very costly for 
the disintegrating state, the Swiss and the Greek ultimately reconsidered their bids to 
renegotiate. 
The reason for this variation in outcomes is rooted in the fact that even though a country 
can unilaterally repudiate its membership in an international institution, the remaining member 
states have a significant say about the terms of any future relationship that is to replace the 
existing cooperative arrangement. How the disintegration process evolves, and whether the 
country pursues or aborts its disintegration request, therefore depends to a large degree on the 
other member states of the international institution. These other states can choose from a wide 
array of possible reactions: One the one extreme, the remaining states can accommodate the 
democratically expressed wish of the other people, e.g. by granting the exceptions demanded 
or by maintaining wide-ranging post-withdrawal cooperation with the withdrawing state. Such 
an accommodation strategy changes the terms of such an agreement to the disintegrating 
country’s benefit ex post, but also preserves the benefits from cooperation to the extent possible. 
However, it comes with two downsides: not only does it tend to leave the remaining member 
states worse off than under the status quo, it also carries considerable political contagion risks 
by setting an attractive precedent for disintegration. On the other extreme, the remaining 
member states can take a hard, non-accommodating stance by refusing to make concessions or 
to grant exceptions and by making withdrawal or non-compliance costly for the disintegrating 
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country. This, in turn, lowers contagion risks and raises the probability that the withdrawing 
state will retract its withdrawal bid (as the Swiss and the Greek ultimately did at the end of the 
negotiations with the EU and the remaining member states). If the withdrawing state does not 
back down, however, this strategy tends to be very costly for the remaining member states as 
they lose out on the benefits of cooperation that they had so far mutually enjoyed. 
Given that both main strategies available to member states have significant downsides, 
the question of how to respond to a unilateral disintegration bid presents policymakers with a 
“accommodation dilemma.” This dilemma creates a strategically difficult situation in which 
public opinion features both as a constraint on and an outcome of the disintegration 
negotiations. The Brexit example illustrates the accommodation dilemma nicely. While 
granting the UK continued access to the EU’s single market would maintain existing economic 
ties and preserve many cooperation gains in the other member states, the remaining EU-27 
member states are weary that such a response might put the entire European project at risk in 
the long run by creating incentives for other countries to defect as well. In contrast, the non-
accommodation strategy might dampen others’ incentives to leave the EU, but would come at 
a high economic price for both the UK and the remaining member states (e.g., Chen et al. 2017).  
Given these negative externalities, policymakers in the other member states need to 
confront the question of how to respond to one member state’s unilateral, mass-based 
disintegration bid. This paper argues that the resulting politics of mass-based disintegration are 
fundamentally shaped by the accommodation dilemma. The remainder of this paper examines 
how the dilemma influences the responses of the remaining member states both before a 
disintegration vote (section 4), and after such a vote (section 5).  
 
4. Challenges for foreign policymakers before the vote 
As we have seen, a unilateral bid for renegotiation of or withdrawal from an 
international institution puts the remaining member states in a difficult and costly situation. The 
best case scenario for policymakers who are confronted with a referendum or election campaign 
abroad aimed at disintegration is therefore a voting outcome in which such disintegration is 
rejected by a popular vote. When faced with a disintegration referendum in another member 
state or an election in which integration-sceptic candidates have a good chance of winning (such 
as in the 2016 US and 2017 French presidential elections), domestic policymakers thus have a 
strong preference for foreign voters to vote against disintegration and in favor of continued 
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integration. This creates incentives for them to get involved in what would normally be regarded 
another country’s domestic affairs: a foreign election or referendum campaign.  
Because the response of the remaining member state to a popular vote in favor of 
disintegration strongly determines how such a vote would ultimately play out for the 
disintegrating country, voters should be interested in learning about the likely response in 
advance. This gives foreign policymakers an opportunity to convey their likely reaction to a 
disintegrative vote. They can use a variety of strategies to communicate their opinion and 
resolve during the election or referendum campaign. Least intrusive, foreign policymakers can 
try to coax voters in the other country to vote in favor of continued cooperation, for example 
by emphasizing the value of continued membership, making normative appeals and promising 
future benefits. However, they can also take a more aggressive stance, for example by warning, 
or even threatening, voters about the negative consequences of a disintegrative vote. Finally, 
they can actively intervene in the campaign, such as European policymakers did in the run-up 
to the 2015 Greek bailout referendum when they cut off Greece from additional financing 
during the referendum campaign. Increasingly, foreign involvement in domestic campaigns 
also occurs in more decentralized forms via social media (Sevin and Uzunoğlu 2017).6  
Such foreign interventions in domestic elections or referendum campaigns raise both 
normative and practical questions. In normative terms, foreign interventions in domestic 
referendum and election campaigns, especially in its more active forms, violate the principle of 
non-interference in domestic affairs and thus conflict with national sovereignty. Yet, as 
democratically elected leaders, foreign policymakers are also tasked to represent the interests 
of their citizens. From this viewpoint, interventions in a foreign campaign with the intention to 
protect the country’s own voters from harm may be legitimate. These normative questions about 
the legitimacy of foreign campaign interventions are difficult to resolve. 
 
The Effectiveness of Foreign Warnings 
Intervening in a domestic disintegration referendum campaign from abroad also poses 
practical challenges. Such intervention is no easy feat, because foreign policymakers face 
obstacles with regard to the credibility, the effectiveness, and the costs of such interventions 
(Walter et al. 2018). Because foreign policymakers act in the interest of their own country, their 
interventions in domestic election campaigns may not be credible or effective. Positive foreign 
                                                        
6 Such direct foreign interventions in domestic elections have been rare among Western democracies, but were more common 
during the Cold War and still are relatively common in developing country elections (see for example Corstange and Marinov 
2012; Levin 2016). I am not considering the outright illegal forms of foreign interventions seen in the recent US elections and 
Brexit campaign here. 
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messages can easily go unheard in a heated domestic campaign. With regards to warnings, 
foreign governments face private information and time-inconsistency problems that make it 
particularly difficult for them to credibly communicate their resolve not to accommodate a non-
cooperative vote (Fearon 1995). Because non-accommodation also imposes costs on those other 
countries themselves, their pledge to punish such a vote ex post may suffer from credibility 
issues and may therefore not be taken seriously by domestic voters. What is worse, they can 
also backfire if voters perceive them as an undue interference in domestic affairs (Shulman and 
Bloom 2012). As such, foreign interventions may not be very effective.  
To illustrate this problem, consider the 2016 Brexit campaign in the UK: Because of the 
large risks that Brexit posed for the European integration project, EU and EU-27 policymakers 
had a strong interest in a ‘remain’-outcome in the referendum. Yet, they were rather hesitant to 
get too strongly involved in the Brexit campaign because it was feared that given the widespread 
British distrust towards to EU, such interventions might strengthen, rather than weaken, the 
Leave-camp (Glencross 2016). In fact, the British prime minister David Cameron, a remainer, 
had asked the EU Commission not to get involved in the Brexit referendum campaign.  
To more systematically examine how warnings by foreign policymakers influence 
respondents’ expectations in a disintegration referendum campaign, I conducted a survey 
experiment with 1778 respondents in Britain about two weeks before the 2016 Brexit 
referendum.7 All respondents were informed that “after a referendum vote to leave the EU, 
Britain and the EU [would] have to negotiate an agreement about their future relationship.” 
Respondents were then randomly given one of four different treatments, in which a domestic 
(The Remain Campaign) or a foreign (the Belgian Prime Minister, the President of the EU 
Commission, or the US president) had “warned that the EU will only sign such an agreement 
if it makes Britain worse off compared to where it stands now.”8 Respondents were then asked 
about their expectations about a potential post-Brexit world, such as whether such an agreement 
would make the EU and the UK better or worse off,9 whether the UK would lose access to the 
EU’s single market, whether such an agreement would leave the UK worse off economically, 
or whether the UK would have less influence in international negotiations than as an EU 
                                                        
7 Data are from an original YouGov online poll, fielded on June 7, 2016, N=1778. Data are weighted. 
8 A fifth control group were not given any warning. Adding the control group in the analysis does not substantively 
change the results presented below. 
9 “Compared to today’s relationship, how do you think this new agreement would look? A new arrangement would 
be worse for both Britain and the EU/ worse for Britain and better for the EU/ better for Britain and worse for the 
EU/ better for both Britain and the EU.” 
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member.10 For the analysis below I recoded the answers to these questions into dummy 
variables that take the value of one for pessimistic expectations.  
Figure 2: Survey Experiment: Effects of threats by different foreign actors on 
expectations 
 
 
Based on logit analyses that control for gender, age, political attention, social grade, education, 
referendum vote intention, figure 2 shows the marginal effects of each of the treatments on the 
likelihood that a respondent has a more negative expectation regarding the foreign response to 
a Leave-outcome in the June 2016 Brexit referendum, with 95% confidence intervals.11 
Although warnings by foreign policymakers, especially European politicians, did make voters 
somewhat more pessimistic, these effects were rarely statistically significant. Warnings 
attributed the US president made voters even more optimistic at times, underlining the difficulty 
                                                        
10 “In the run-up to the referendum, we have heard many different arguments about what would happen if the UK 
were to leave the EU. For each of the following scenarios, how likely do you think that this scenario will come 
true if Britain votes to leave the EU in the referendum?: If Britain votes to leave the EU, Britain will …negotiate 
an agreement with the EU that leaves it worse off economically than it is today. … lose full access to the EU’s 
single market. … have less influence in international negotiations than as a EU member.”  
11 Results are the same when I only control for the referendum vote intention, which had been elicited at an 
earlier point in the survey 
Remain Camp
Belgian PM
EU Comm. President
US president
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Marginal effects
New EU-UK agreement will be worse for UK UK will lose single-market access
UK economy worse less international influence
Note: Controlling for gender, age, political attention, social grade, education, referendum vote intention
In the run-up to the referendum, there have been many different arguments about what would happen
if the UK were to leave the EU. For each of the following scenarios, how likely do you think that this scenario
will come true if Britain votes to leave the EU in the referendum?
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of the task. Figure 2 thus shows how difficult it is for foreign policymakers to sway public 
opinion in disintegration referendum campaigns. Influencing expectations, beliefs, and vote 
intentions of voters in another country is no easy task in such a setting. 
 
The Effectiveness of Costly Signals 
Faced with these difficulties of signaling their resolve, another way for foreign policymakers 
to increase the credibility of their interventions is to send costly signals about their 
determination not to accommodate a voting outcome that would harm their own citizens (Walter 
et al. 2018). To be effective, however, these signals have to carry considerable costs, without 
any guarantee that this investment will pay off. A prominent example is the referendum 
campaign leading up to the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, in which Eurozone policymakers 
intervened to an unprecedented degree. The bailout referendum tried to force Greece’s creditors 
to give it better terms on a bailout agreement for the crisis-ridden country by rejecting the 
existing offer through a referendum vote. An accommodation of Greece’s wishes would have 
fundamentally changed the EMU crisis management mode, which is why the other Eurozone 
member states were adamantly opposed to a Greek exception. However, they were at the same 
time highly exposed to the consequences of the referendum: A rejection of the bailout 
agreement (a “no”-vote) was feared to result in “Grexit”, and hence a break-up of the Eurozone, 
which European policymakers had tried to avoid throughout the Eurozone crisis (Copelovitch, 
Frieden, and Walter 2016). As a result, European policymakers strongly intervened in the Greek 
campaign, warning that a Greek no-vote would not result in better terms for a new bailout 
package, but rather result in Greece’s exit from the Eurozone. After all, Grexit was also an 
outcome which a strong majority of Greeks did not want.  
To underline their resolve, European policymakers resorted to a clear demonstration of their 
determination not to accommodate a referendum vote against the bailout agreement on offer. 
When the existing bailout agreement expired during the referendum campaign, they refused to 
extend it for a few days. The ECB also declined Greece’s request to increase emergency 
liquidity assistance to Greek banks. These decisions forced the Greek government to close the 
banks and to become the first developed country to ever default on an IMF loan early on in the 
referendum campaign. The costs of this European signal of resolve were immense, not just for 
Greece, but also for the other Eurozone governments. They caused enormous economic 
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damage, which at least doubled the amount Eurozone governments ultimately had to invest in 
a third bailout package for Greece. 12  
Did this costly signal convince Greek voters of Europeans resolve? Evidence collected by 
Walter, Dinas, Jurado and Konstantinidis (2018) shows that right before the vote, a majority of 
Greeks believed that a non-cooperative referendum outcome would result in continued 
negotiations, whereas only about one quarter thought that a No-vote would lead to Grexit. Thus, 
the foreign intervention in the Greek referendum campaign failed to convince Greek voters of 
the European resolve not to accommodate a negative vote. Nonetheless, Figure 3 shows that 
the intervention on net did sway about 10% of Greek voters away from voting no and towards 
voting yes.13 Given the huge costs, this is a rather meagre result. Ultimately, the foreign 
intervention did not succeed in changing the referendum outcome in favor of a cooperative 
outcome. 
Figure 3: Effect of the Greek bank shutdown on average support for the bailout proposal 
(cooperative outcome) in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, based on 33 polls on 
referendum vote intention. 
  
Note: Each dot/triangle represents a poll published during the referendum campaign. The blue curve denotes local 
average estimates, shaded areas denote 95% confidence bands. Figure is from Walter et al (Walter et al. 2018). 
 
                                                        
12 see http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/06/economist-explains-5 and 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_en.htm 
13 Survey evidence suggests that about 12% of voters switched from No to yes, but about 4% also hardened their 
position and switched from yes to now (Walter et al. 2018). 
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Overall, intervening in other countries’ election or referendum campaigns is a tricky 
path for policymakers, not just because of normative legitimacy concerns, but also for practical 
reasons.  
 
5. Responding to successful disintegration referendums 
How can the other member states of an international institution respond if voters in one 
member state have cast a popular vote in favor of disintegration? Assuming that the other 
member states want to maintain the cooperative arrangement, this question once more poses 
significant challenges for the remaining member states, who are now squarely confronted with 
the accommodation dilemma: On the one hand, refusing to renegotiate an agreement or insisting 
that a withdrawal from an existing agreement means that the disintegrating country can no 
longer enjoy the benefits of cooperation. This highlights the benefits of the existing 
arrangement and is thus likely to reduce the risk of political contagion. At the same time, such 
a strategy is highly costly not just for the leaving state, but also for the remaining member 
states.14 Whether it is worthwhile to pursue this strategy thus depends both on how real the risks 
of political contagion are, and how high the net costs of non-accommodation are for the 
remaining member states. The next two sections explore both of these questions. 
 
Assessing the risks of political contagion 
One of the core concerns for remaining member state governments is that 
accommodation carries considerable risks of political contagion because it demonstrates that 
countries can unilaterally improve their position through mass-based disintegration bids in a 
highly politicized context in which voters are likely to pay particular attention. How realistic is 
this prospect? 
                                                        
14 They are also confronted with normative questions: Is it undemocratic not to implement the democratically 
expressed wish of (one) people? Or is it undemocratic to implement a policy that produces negative externalities 
for others without asking them about it? The fierce criticism of the EU’s “undemocratic” response to the Greek 
bailout referendum, embodied in the hashtag #thisisacoup, illustrates the appeal of the first position.14 The hashtag 
made the round on twitter after Greece had been forced to accept a third bailout package in the post-referendum 
negotiations. This third bailout came with harsh conditionality, the very thing Greek voters had just rejected in the 
referendum. Critics thus argued that by not accommodating the Greek referendum vote, the remaining EU member 
states had shown a disrespect for democracy, staging in fact a “coup” against democracy. Eurozone policymakers 
countered this argument by emphasizing that they had been elected to represent their own citizens’ interests, not 
Greece’s, and that their citizens would be worse off if a Greek vote could force them to accommodate their 
demands. 
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For voters, it is generally difficult to correctly predict how one’s country would fare if 
it left an existing international institution. Voters can compare their own country relative to 
others to imagine such a counterfactual situation, for example by benchmarking their country’s 
economic performance (e.g., Gärtner 1997; Hobolt and Leblond 2009; Hobolt and Leblond 
2013), or national political system (Rohrschneider 2002; e.g., Anderson 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca 
2000; Armingeon and Ceka 2013; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). But such national benchmarks are 
imperfect proxies, especially because so much depends on the nature of the future relations 
between the withdrawing state and the members of the international institution. Voters tend to 
understand this strategic complication (Christin, Hug, and Sciarini 2002; Finke and Beach 2017; 
Hobolt 2009; Dinas et al. 2017), but for lack of a realistic counterfactual often misperceive the 
strategic incentives of the other member states. Some voters therefore imagine their country’s 
post-integration future in too rosy a color (e.g., Milic 2015; Owen and Walter 2017; Sciarini, 
Lanz, and Nai 2015; Walter et al. 2018), and such optimism makes voters more willing to risk 
breaking apart from an international organization. For example, more than 90 percent of Greek 
voters who rejected the bailout agreement in the 2015 referendum expected their vote to result 
in continued negotiations and a better bailout package (Jurado, Konstantinidis, and Walter 
2015), and two thirds of “Leave”-voters in the Brexit referendum believed that the UK would 
retain full access to the EU’s single market post-Brexit (Owen and Walter 2017). 
By observing another country’s efforts to disintegrate from a common (or similar) 
international institution, voters can update these beliefs. Another country’s disintegration 
experience thus provides voters with a powerful counterfactual that allows them to assess more 
accurately to what extent disintegration presents a viable and better alternative to membership 
in the international institution (de Vries 2017; Walter 2017). It informs voters about the likely 
response of the other member states and of the likely economic, social, and political 
consequences of disintegration. A disintegration experience that improves the situation of the 
withdrawing country demonstrates that integration can be reversed and that nation states can be 
better off on their own. This creates an “encouragement effect” that makes successful 
disintegration of one member state “socially contagious” (Pacheco 2012). By observing this 
experience, voters in other countries become more optimistic about national prospects outside 
the international institution, which encourages the spread of disintegrative tendencies abroad.15 
Such a diffusion of disintegrative tendencies among the institution’s remaining members, 
however, threatens the long-run viability of the international institution as a whole.  
                                                        
15 This effect has also been well documented in the context of secession on the national level (e.g., Coggins 2011). 
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These political contagion risks in turn create incentives for the remaining member states 
to pursue a hard, non-accommodating strategy that inflicts high costs on the withdrawing 
country.16 When the disintegrating country fails in its efforts to change or leave the international 
institution, voters in other countries equally update their beliefs: Observing that a country is 
worse-off post-disintegration (or aborts its disintegration bid for fear of negative consequences) 
is likely to make them more pessimistic about their own country’s post-disintegration future. 
Such a “deterrence effect” should thus decreases voters’ enthusiasm for an exit of their own 
country. Beyond the effect on disintegration support, the encouragement and deterrence effect 
are also likely to influence how voters evaluate the international institution and the merits of 
international cooperation more generally (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Clements, Nanou, and Verney 
2014).17  
A rigorous test of these hypotheses would require a dynamic analysis of how individuals 
respond to disintegration negotiations and outcomes, and how this feeds back into their own 
support for an international institution and demands for disintegration. While such an analysis 
would ideally be based on a huge and longitudinal (preferably panel) data collection effort, 
which I am currently engaged in, I here present some preliminary data that uses correlational 
evidence from the Brexit case to examine whether individuals take the fate of a disintegrating 
country into account when forming an opinion about whether they themselves support 
disintegration of their own state. To this end I use data from an EU-wide online poll that Dalia 
Research conducted on my behalf in June 2018 on public opinion across 28 EU Member States 
(see also Walter 2017b). The sample consists of 9,423 working-age respondents (ages 18-65), 
drawn across the remaining 27 EU Member States,18 with sample sizes roughly proportional to 
their population size. In order to obtain census representative results, the data were weighted 
based upon the most recent Eurostat statistics.19  
Respondents’ support for disintegration of their own country from the EU was measured 
with the question “If [YOUR COUNTRY] were to hold a referendum on leaving the EU today, 
                                                        
16 An example for a non-accommodation strategy is the EU’s reaction to Switzerland’s referendum vote in 2014 
to restrict immigration and subsequent decision not to extend freedom of movement to nationals of a new EU 
member state (Croatia) in violation of its bilateral treaties with the EU. The EU retaliated by barring Switzerland’s 
access to the new Horizon 2020 research program, which eventually succeeded in convincing the Swiss parliament 
not to implement the referendum and to honor its obligations enshrined in the bilateral treaties. 
17 These effects are not limited to voters in other countries, but may extend to voters in the leaving state – who 
may update and potentially change their preferences as the true benefits or costs of disintegration are revealed. 
18 I omit the UK for the analysis.  
19 The target weighting variables were age, gender, level of education (as defined by ISCED (2011) levels 0-2, 3-
4, and 5-8), and degree of urbanization (rural and urban). Results are robust to using only the data from the biggest 
five countries, whose sample sizes exceed N=1000. 
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how would you vote?”. I recoded the answers as 0 for those who said they would probably or 
definitely vote to remain in the EU and 1 for those would probably or definitely vote to leave. 
I then examine how assessments about the likely effect of Brexit on the UK are associated with 
the propensity of respondents to support an exit of their own country from the EU. I use the 
question “Five years from now on, do you think Brexit will make the UK much better 
off/somewhat better off/neither better nor worse off/somewhat worse off/much worse off?” Of 
course, this opinion will be strongly influenced by what respondents’ attitudes about the EU. I 
therefore control for the respondent’s general opinion of the EU, using the question “What is 
your opinion of the EU? Very negative/Somewhat negative/Neither negative nor 
positive/Somewhat positive/Very positive”. Figure 4 shows that indeed, expectations about 
whether Brexit will be positive or negative for the UK vary significantly among euroskeptics 
and Europhiles. 
 
Figure 4: Histogram of expectations about the effect of Brexit on the UK, by EU opinion  
 
Because research has shown that Euroskepticism is a multidimensional concept (Hobolt 
and de Vries 2016), I additionally control for respondent’s views about the EU’s competences: 
“Which statement best describes your views about the future of the European Union? The EU 
should return some power to national governments/The division of power between national 
governments and the EU should remain as it is today/National governments should transfer 
don't know
much worse
somewhat worse
neither pos/neg
      somewhat better
much better
Br
ex
it e
ffe
ct 
on
 U
K 
(in
 5
 yr
s)
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Density
Euroskeptics
don't know
much worse
somewhat worse
neither pos/neg
      somewhat better
much better
Br
ex
it e
ffe
ct 
on
 U
K 
(in
 5
 yr
s)
0 .1 .2 .3
Density
Neutral towards EU
don't know
much worse
somewhat worse
neither pos/neg
      somewhat better
much better
Br
ex
it e
ffe
ct 
on
 U
K 
(in
 5
 yr
s)
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Density
Europhiles
 19 
more power to the EU.” Moreover, I control for sociodemographic variables: age, gender, 
education, whether the respondent lives in a rural or urban setting, and the respondent’s country.  
Figure 5 shows the marginal effects from a logit regression on the likely vote in a 
national exit referendum in the respondent’s own country. It demonstrates that both a deterrence 
and an encouragement effect are at play: Those who assess the UK’s prospects outside the EU 
more pessimistically are less likely to vote for an exit of their own country from the EU. 
Likewise, those who think that the UK will do well after it has left the European Union are also 
more likely to potentially vote leave if their own country held an exit referendum. This effect 
holds even after two different dimensions of EU-related opinions are controlled for. Not 
surprisingly, a possible disintegration vote is strongly influenced by these opinions. 
Nonetheless, the likely effect of Brexit on the UK exerts an additional effect on respondents’ 
vote intentions. 
 
Figure 5: Deterrence and encouragement effects of Brexit 
 
Figure 6 shows that deterrence and encouragement effects can also be observed when 
we split up the sample according to people’s opinion of the EU. This suggests that the 
accommodation dilemma exists. Nonetheless, future research should explore in more detail 
whether a tough negotiating stance indeed influences voters’ expectations and perceptions 
about the likely consequences of disintegration for their own country. 
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Figure 6: Deterrence and encouragement effects of Brexit, by EU opinion 
 
 
Variation in government responses to unilateral, mass-based disintegration bids 
The contagion risks associated with one member state’s withdrawal from an 
international institution are not just the outcome of the disintegration negotiations, but 
themselves influence these negotiations.20 These negotiations will be fundamentally shaped by 
the accommodation dilemma, the trade-off between the costs of a non-accommodative strategy 
and the contagion risks implied by an accommodative strategy. The contours of this dilemma 
and the extent to which it shapes international disintegration negotiations is likely to vary across 
member states and disintegration cases, however.  
                                                        
20 Note that the bargaining mandate can also be exercised by representatives of the international institution as such, 
as the EU did in the negotiations about the implementation of the Swiss mass immigration initiative. But because 
the bargaining outcome needs to be ratified by the remaining member states if it suggests substantive changes to 
the existing agreement, member state positions will be influential in these instances as well. 
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First, countries weigh the costs of non-accommodation more heavily when the potential 
costs of this strategy to the domestic economy and society are high. The net costs of 
disintegration are usually distributed unequally among member states and also differ across 
different issues. They are highest when a member state depends strongly on cooperation with 
the disintegrating state, and when its ability to potentially benefit from opportunities created by 
disintegration is low. This exposure to non-accommodation can vary considerably: a “hard 
Brexit,” for example, is estimated to put less than 0.5% of Slovakia’s and Bulgaria’s GDP, but 
more than 10% of Irish GDP at risk (Chen et al. 2017). I would expect that states will be 
particularly hawkish on issues on which their net domestic costs of non-accommodation are 
small, but more dovish on issues where non-accommodation is very costly for their domestic 
economy and society.  
Second, political contagion risks influence national negotiating positions. Because the 
bargaining outcome is likely to have significant spillover effects on the support for the 
international institution in all remaining member states, public opinion moves in the spotlight 
of the disintegration negotiations. Feedback effects between international negotiations and 
domestic public opinion are well known in international relations research (e.g. research on 
two-level games (Putnam 1988), audience costs (Tomz 2007; e.g. Fearon 1994) or the role of 
domestic politics for international politics more generally (Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik 1997; 
e.g. Milner 1997)). In addition to these vertical linkages between voters and their governments, 
however, the contagion effects in disintegration negotiations mean that policymakers need to 
consider the contagion risks in other member states and in the withdrawing country (diagonal 
linkages) in parallel with the political contagion risks in their own country (vertical linkages). 
The higher the contagion risks in at least one member state, the more hawkish governments’ 
negotiation positions will usually be overall. This means that even if a government represents 
a country in which the mass public strongly supports continued membership, it will opt for a 
non-accommodating strategy if it fears that accommodation will encourage integration-sceptics 
in another remaining member state. High contagion risks at home or in another member state 
thus increase support for a non-accommodation strategy. This effect will be particularly 
pronounced when the disintegration process is highly politicized. And because ideas also matter 
in international negotiations (e.g., McNamara 1998; Risse 2004), more integration-sceptic 
governments will be less concerned about contagion risks.  
Third, non-accommodation can be very costly, but also increases the likelihood that the 
withdrawing state might back down – generally the best outcome for the remaining states. This 
suggests that the remaining member states have stronger incentives to pursue a non-
 22 
accommodative strategy vis-à-vis the disintegrating state when there are nontrivial chances that 
such a strategy will result in a retraction of the disintegration bid. This is most likely when the 
bargaining power of the remaining states is high. The level of bargaining power depends on a 
number of factors (Finke et al. 2012; Thomson et al. 2006; Moravcsik 1997; Bailer, Mattila, 
and Schneider 2015; Keohane and Nye 1977). The leverage of the remaining members tends to 
be higher when the number of remaining member states is high, when the interdependence 
between the disintegrating and the remaining member states is asymmetric and in favor of the 
latter (Keohane and Nye 1977), and when non-accommodation means continuing the status quo 
(Schimmelfennig 2017). Relative bargaining power also depends on the institutional setup of 
the withdrawal process, frequently specified in the form of exit clauses (Rosendorff and Milner 
2001; Kucik and Reinhardt 2008; Pelc 2009) that disadvantage the withdrawing state. Finally, 
the remaining member states also have more bargaining power when their preferences are 
homogenous with regard to a certain issue. For example, the ranks will be much more closed 
on issues such as continued financial contributions of the withdrawing state – which virtually 
all states are likely to favor – than on issues such as preferential market access, where positions 
are likely to be much more divided.  
Against this backdrop, one would expect the remaining member states to vary in their 
responses to a disintegration referendum. Research examining and explaining this variation so 
far barely exists, but some observations stand out: First of all, the choice of strategy depends 
on the relative bargaining power of the concerned parties. For example, the EU is engaging 
with the UK’s wish to leave the EU, whereas it refused to even officially open negotiations 
about a potential treaty change with Switzerland. This partly reflects the fact that the UK has a 
much larger economy and is more deeply integrated with the EU-27 countries than Switzerland. 
Likewise, Canada and Mexico have agreed to open renegotiations of the NAFTA agreement, 
even though they have been less willing to accommodate the United States’ demands to 
improve the agreements terms only in the latter’s favor.  
Second, the remaining member states vary in their degree of unity in disintegration 
negotiations. In the negotiations following the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, for example, 
Eurozone governments were split in their opinion about whether Greece should be allowed to 
leave (or be kicked out of) the Eurozone. In contrast, in the Brexit negotiations, the remaining 
EU-27 countries have shown a high degree of unity in the Brexit negotiations so far. However, 
the negotiations to date have covered aspects of Brexit on which there is little debate among 
the EU-27 – for example, everybody is in favor of the UK paying more. Figure 6a shows the 
positions of the remaining member states on the issues discussed so far, based on assessments 
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of national negotiation positions made by the Economist Intelligence Unit (The Economist 
2017). However, figure 6b, which considers a larger range of issues in the Brexit negotiations, 
including, for example, security, shows considerable variation in the long-run Brexit-approach 
among the remaining EU member states.  
Figure 6a:  
Brexit positions, negotiation phase I 
Figure 6b:  
Overall Brexit negotiation positions 
  
 
6. Conclusion: Mass-based disintegration, a democratic threat to international 
cooperation? 
The recent successes of populist parties, candidates, and initiatives have often been 
based on a common narrative: that by being more assertive in international relations and putting 
the nation’s interest first rather than accepting compromise, the country’s prosperity, national 
sovereignty, and democratic quality could be improved. Upon closer inspection, however, these 
promises have usually proven to be built on quicksand. Successes at the domestic polls have 
been met with resistance abroad. Renegotiating international agreements has proven difficult, 
if not impossible, and has sometimes forced populist governments to concede that the status 
quo is better than what they could achieve if they left such an agreement. Although these 
setbacks have decreased the appeal of such messages to some extent (de Vries 2017), they still 
garner considerable support.  
This paper has demonstrated that so far, mass-based attempts to unilaterally change or 
withdraw from the rules of international cooperation have not failed because of poor negotiation 
skills on part of the governments of the withdrawing states, but because they invoke a central 
trilemma in international relations: Rarely do the trade-offs between international cooperation, 
very soft
very hard
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democracy, and national sovereignty (Rodrik 2011) move into the spotlight more prominently 
than when one country votes on an issue in which other countries equally have a large stake.  
Yet the failure of populist promises to materialize bears its own risk. When governments 
tasked with implementing populist referendum outcomes have not been able to deliver the 
promised lands of milk and honey, they have been decried by populists as incompetent or 
unwilling to implement the will of the people. Resistance of foreign governments against one 
country’s wishes for unilateral change has been condemned as a lack of respect of democracy. 
And because intergovernmental bargaining tends to take place between a relatively small 
number of few government officials behind closed doors, its outcomes have often been 
characterized as elitist decisions by bureaucrats who have lost touch with normal people. There 
is thus a risk that the failure of mass-based disintegration initiatives breeds even more 
resentment and feeding ground for populists. Dealing with this democratic threat to the liberal 
world order is no easy task. It is important, but not easy, for policymakers to communicate 
clearly the trade-offs and constraints under which they operate. They also need to straddle the 
rope between accommodating too much and risking contagion on one hand, and 
accommodating too little and risking backlash on the other. Only one thing is certain: it is 
impossible to ignore this challenge to international cooperation from below. 
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